

**UNDERSTANDING LITERAL AND DIRECT ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS IN
COMMUNICATIVE SPEECH**

Shamuratova Bonu

Student of the Department of Translation Theory and Practice at the Faculty of Foreign Philology
of Urganch State University

Abstract: This article explores the concept of literal and direct illocutionary acts within the framework of the Speech Act Schema (SAS). It examines the foundational presumptions necessary for interpreting literal communication, such as linguistic, communicative, and presumption of literalness, and discusses the criteria for conversational appropriateness, including relevance, quantity, quality, manner, politeness, and morality. By analyzing these elements, the article provides insights into how speakers convey and listeners interpret illocutionary intent, enhancing our understanding of effective and meaningful communication.

Key words: Literal Illocutionary Acts, Speech Act Schema, Conversational Appropriateness, Linguistic Presumptions, Communicative Presumptions, Relevance, Illocutionary Intent

INTRODUCTION (ВВЕДЕНИЕ / KIRISH)

The study of speech acts, particularly illocutionary acts, is fundamental to understanding human communication. Illocutionary acts refer to the intent behind utterances, distinguishing what we say from what we mean. This article delves into the concept of literal and direct illocutionary acts, offering insights into their characterization, the role of mutual contextual beliefs, and the framework provided by the Speech Act Schema (SAS). Through this exploration, we can better understand how literal communication functions in our everyday interactions.

MATERIALS AND METHODS (ЛИТЕРАТУРА И МЕТОД / ADABIYOTLAR TAHLILI VA METOD)

The Speech Act Schema (SAS)

The Speech Act Schema (SAS) is a theoretical framework that helps in characterizing the performance of various illocutionary acts. By selecting appropriate values for variables such as e (expression) and p (proposition), and specifying mutual contextual beliefs (MCBs), the SAS provides a structured method to analyze literal illocutionary acts. This schema is essential in identifying how speakers convey their intentions and how listeners interpret them (Searle, 1969).

Presumptions in Literal Communication

To understand literal and direct illocutionary acts, it is crucial to consider several foundational presumptions within a linguistic community:

1. Linguistic Presumption (LP):

- Members of a linguistic community (CL) share a common language (L).

- Whenever a member (S) utters an expression (e) in L to another member (H), H can identify what S is saying, provided H knows the meanings of e and is aware of relevant background information.

2. Communicative Presumption (CP):

- There is a mutual belief in CL that when a member (S) says something to another member (H), S does so with recognizable illocutionary intent (Austin, 1962).

3. Presumption of Literalness (PL):

- If S could be speaking literally in uttering e, then it is presumed that S is speaking literally.

These presumptions form the foundation for interpreting literal illocutionary acts, ensuring that communication is both meaningful and interpretable within the given context.

Literal and Direct Illocutionary Acts

Literal and direct illocutionary acts are the most straightforward form of speech acts. They occur when the act is performed directly, without relying on another illocutionary act. For instance,

when someone says, "John will pay Sam back," and they mean exactly that, they are performing a literal and direct illocutionary act.

RESULTS (РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ / NATIJALAR)

The SAS characterizes this performance through a series of logical steps:

1. Literal Performance Steps:

- L1: S is uttering e.
- L2: S means by e.
- L3: S is saying that (p).
- L4: If S is speaking literally, S is performing act F (e.g., constating).
- L5: S could be performing act F.
- L6: S is performing act F.

By following these steps, listeners (H) can infer the speaker's (S) intent, ensuring that the communication is interpreted as intended.

Example of a Literal Illocutionary Act

Consider the sentence, "John will pay Sam back." The steps of interpretation are as follows:

1. L1: S is uttering the sentence "John will pay Sam back."
2. L2: S means 'John will repay Sam' by the sentence.
3. L3: S is saying that John will repay Sam.
4. L4: If S is speaking literally, S is constating that John will repay Sam.
5. L5: S could be speaking literally.
6. L6: (a) S is constating that John will repay Sam.
- (b) S is predicting that John will repay Sam.

The listener (H) uses these steps, alongside their mutual contextual beliefs, to accurately interpret the speaker's intent.

Conversational Appropriateness

For a speaker's contribution to be deemed appropriate within a conversation, it must align with certain conversational presumptions. These include:

1. Relevance (RE):
 - The speaker's contribution must be relevant to the conversation at that point (Grice, 1975).
2. Sequencing (SE):
 - The contribution should be of an illocutionary type appropriate to the stage of the conversation.
3. Sincerity (SI):
 - The speaker's contribution must be sincere, reflecting their true attitudes.

Quantity and Quality of Information

In addition to relevance, the quantity and quality of information provided by the speaker are crucial:

1. Quantity (QT):
 - The speaker's constative should provide the requisite amount of information—neither too much nor too little.
2. Quality (QL):
 - The speaker attempts to make their constative true and has adequate evidence for what they are stating (Grice, 1975).

Manner of Performance

The manner in which the speaker delivers their speech act also matters. According to Grice's maxims, the speaker should:

1. Avoid Ambiguity:
 - Speak clearly to prevent misunderstandings.
2. Avoid Obscurity:

- Use language that is straightforward and easy to understand.

3. Avoid Unnecessary Prolixity:

- Be concise and to the point.

4. Be Orderly:

- Present information in a logical and coherent manner.

Politeness and Morality

Finally, the social dimensions of politeness and morality play a role in ensuring appropriate communication:

1. Politeness (PO):

- The speaker should be polite, avoiding offensive or abusive language.

2. Morality (MO):

- The speaker should act morally, not revealing inappropriate information or making requests that are unethical.

DISCUSSION (ОБСУЖДЕНИЕ / MUHOKAMA)

Inferring Specific Illocutionary Intent

Understanding how a listener infers a speaker's specific illocutionary intent involves recognizing that communication is often guided by shared beliefs and expectations. If the communicative presumption (CP) is in effect, the listener will presume that the speaker's illocutionary intent is recognizable and aligns with conversational presumptions.

For example, if a speaker says, "John will repay Sam," and it is mutually believed that the speaker has no influence over John, the statement may be interpreted as a prediction rather than a guarantee. Conversely, if no one has claimed that John will not repay Sam, the remark is unlikely to be taken as a dissentive.

CONCLUSION (ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ / XULOSA)

The exploration of literal and direct illocutionary acts highlights the intricate nature of human communication. By utilizing the Speech Act Schema (SAS) and understanding various conversational presumptions, we can better interpret and perform literal illocutionary acts. These frameworks ensure that our contributions to conversations are relevant, appropriate, and sincere, ultimately fostering effective and meaningful communication.

Understanding these principles not only enhances our grasp of linguistic theory but also improves our everyday interactions, making us more competent communicators in both personal and professional contexts. As we continue to explore the nuances of speech acts, we gain deeper insights into the mechanisms that underpin our ability to convey and interpret meaning in the vast landscape of human discourse.

REFERENCES (ИСПОЛЬЗОВАННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА / ADABIYOTLAR RO'YHATI)

- Austin, J. L. (1962). *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford University Press.
- Grice, H. P. (1975). "Logic and Conversation." In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), *Syntax and Semantics: Vol. 3. Speech Acts* (pp. 41-58). Academic Press.
- Searle, J. R. (1969). *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge University Press.