

**REMITTANCE DEPENDENCE AND LABOR MIGRATION: PROTECTION OF  
UZBEK MIGRANTS ABROAD**

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**Abstract.** Labour migration plays a huge role in the economy of Uzbekistan, with more than one million citizens employed abroad and remittances remain a major pillar of economic stability. This research paper analyzes the issues of remittance dependence, labor migration and protection of Uzbek migrants abroad. This paper examines how domestic unemployment, low wages, limited access to employment opportunities effect migration. It also analyzes migration of Uzbek citizens before and after 2017, highlighting legal protection of Uzbek migrants abroad. The main focus of the paper is vulnerability of migrants, especially female migrant workers and individuals who work in informal sectors. This research paper answers the questions why many Uzbek citizens leave their country for work, what are the root causes, how this issue has changed over time and what can be done to address this issue. The paper concludes by proposing recommendations to strengthen labor market, to address the issues of skill mismatch and female migration.

**Key words:** Uzbekistan, labor migration, remittance dependence, migrant protection, skills mismatch, female migration, 'Mardikor' phenomenon, overeducation.

**Introduction.** Nowadays, more than 1.2 million citizens of Uzbekistan work abroad (Uza.uz, 2026). Most of them work in Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkiye, South Korea and other countries. These migrants usually work in physically demanding sectors such as manufacturing, construction, agriculture and domestic services where the salary is low and informal. Many people migrate because of limited job opportunities (Euronews, 2025). In 2025, Uzbekistan has received \$18.9 billion in remittances which shows how remittances plays an important role in the economy of Uzbekistan (Kun.uz, 2026). In fact, remittances make a significant contribution to the national economy by supporting families to afford basic living needs such as healthcare, education and food (World Bank, 2025) However, this remittance dependence also creates significant challenges. For example, many Uzbek migrants often work in difficult conditions with informal contracts or insufficient legal protection. In addition, they face language barriers which makes even more difficult to communicate at work and access basic services. Some migrants also face unsafe working environments and unfair treatment when they are in irregular migration status. These problems increase vulnerability in labour market. Therefore, International Labor Organization (ILO) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) highlight the need for protection of migrant workers (Central Bank of Uzbekistan, 2026). That is why the large number of migrants and dependence on remittances make Uzbekistan one of the most remittance and migration dependent countries in the world. However, this also raises questions about how Uzbek migrants are protected and whether the country depends too much on money sent from abroad.

**The crisis of human capital: The skills mismatch and overeducation**



The increasing mismatch between higher education and real job opportunities available in the labor market is one of the major causes of migration (World Bank, 2023). According to the National Statistics Committee, the government of Uzbekistan has been expanding access to universities to benefit from the young people of the country in recent years. At first, the high number of students were able to get a university diploma, which seemed to be a major achievement (Yuz.uz, 2025). However, according to the report by World Bank (2023) while the number of university graduates is increasing, the quality of education and labor market demand are not improving at the same pace. Many students with university diplomas cannot find stable jobs as they lack practical technical skills (Asian Development Bank, 2022). This has created what many researchers now call the "Diploma Paradox", which is a reality where youth spend years obtaining a higher education diploma but still cannot find a stable job. Therefore, migration is not simply a choice, but it is a pathway towards financial stability and a more predictable future for many graduates.

According to the Youth Research Office, Uzbekistan will have a significant increase in high education infrastructure by 2026, more precisely, the number of universities will have increased from 69 to 222, while the total number of students enrolled in universities will have increased more than 5 times, from approximately 264,300 to over 1.43 million. In fact, this increase was intended to raise gross higher education enrollment from 9% in 2017 to 42% by 2023, but it ended up resulting in a systematic vertical mismatch, where the volume of graduates is greater than the number of formal jobs available in the labor market (Youth Research Office, 2026). For example, annually, 214,000 finance and 22,000 law students graduate the universities. However, official employment rates remain at a mere 19.5% to 28%. This overeducation serves as a powerful factor as graduates with diplomas but no jobs choose international migration to capture wage premium.

The development of higher education was the major instrument of the government to maintain young people longer in education, as the labor market was already extremely overwhelmed. However, the universities expanded faster than the number of qualified teachers and effective regulations, so the focus shifted towards awarding diplomas rather than providing real practical skills (Hafiza Rustamova, 2026). As a result, the higher education system is often seen as social status instead of the center of knowledge or practical skills.

Hafiza Rustamova (2026) reported that the weak cooperation between universities and industries made situation even worse since universities focus more on the academic knowledge, many graduates graduate with diploma but no technical or practical skills. Qodirjonov (2025) also found out that around 50 % of industry firms struggle to find qualified workers and this problem is more visible in areas such as entrepreneurship and engineering.

### **Informal sector and Mardikor Phenomenon**

Franco Galdini (2023) states that the failure of government in creating formal job opportunities has pushed a large proportion of labor force into informal sector which was locally called Mardikor. According to his research, approximately 29 % of Uzbek citizens work in informal labor markets without any social protection. This structural issue comes from the Uzbek model of economic changes post-Soviet era, which destroyed the previous social support arrangement established during a period of collectivism (Franco Galdini, 2023). Therefore, many rural individuals lost reliable access to land and permanent employment, resulting in a substantial community of workers with restricted economic prospects.

Furthermore, the lack of formal jobs drives internal migration which means that rural workers migrate to Tashkent in search of jobs in construction and service (International Labor



Organization, 2025). Based on UNDP report, Tashkent represents 70-80% of mardikor activity, where workers experience wage theft and inadequate enforcement of law.

Urinboyev and Sobirov (2024) argue that in the absence of effective economic support from the government, a debt-based economy has arisen, with trade facilitated by trust-dependent networks rather than formal legal contracts. According to their research paper, local entrepreneurs (rassiychilar) conduct highly complex exports to Russia using verbal agreements rather than legal documentation. This informal method of trade is a direct response to the banking industry, which remains inaccessible and inflexible. Based on the UNDP (2025) analysis, the urban labor market is similarly highly separated, which implies that significant companies like automobile manufacture are primarily state-controlled and give few job opportunities. As a result, many more people are forced to work in low-productivity occupations, small companies, or informal trade in order to earn basic living expenses. Albina Yun (2016) claims that Institutional corruption and a lack of personal networks keep university graduates and displaced rural people outside of the official economy. As a result, migration to Russia or Kazakhstan provides a crucial protection mechanism for a surplus labor force which the government-dominated economy cannot properly absorb.

### **The Gender imbalance of Labor Absorption and Demographic Push Factors**

The increasing number of young citizens and rapid population growth in Uzbekistan creates opportunities for economic growth, however, the current economic environment cannot handle such a huge number of individuals entering the labor market. With regard to statistics by Youth Research Office (2026), the number of citizens has been increasing by more than 900,000 annually, resulting in more than 700,000 new employees joining the workforce each year. Even though, the government makes 300,000 formal jobs available each year, there will be still persistent shortfall (Youth Research Office, 2026). The annual surplus can be modeled as:

$$\text{Labor surplus} = \text{Workforce Entry} - \text{Jobs creation}$$

$$\text{Labor surplus} = 700,000 - 300,000 = 400,000$$

According International Labor Organization (2023) this pressure on labor market is compounded by the feminization of migration. ILO statistics shows that approximately 48% of the country's international migrants are female, while over 60% of those departing for permanent residence are women. Many of those migrant females do foreign employment in the home service, construction, agriculture and industrial sectors.

This change is mostly driven by gender disparity in Uzbekistan. Women have fewer opportunities for employment than men, therefore they are more likely to remain unemployed (33,1% for females compared to 18,9% for males) and earn only approximately 2/3 of what men earn. Females in Uzbekistan spend more time for daily unpaid work (average 5,27 hours) compared to males (about 2,15 hours), reflecting traditional gender norms that restrict their official economic participation (ILO, 2023).

William Seitz (2019) states that migration is becoming effective method of reducing poverty in Uzbekistan. In his research paper about migration and household well-being, he claims that without remittances the poverty rate of Uzbekistan could rise from 9,6 % to 16,8 %. The effect of remittance loss can be modeled as:



Poverty increase = ((Remittance is absent Poverty rate - there is remittance currently Poverty rate) / there is remittance currently Poverty rate) \* 100

$$P_{\text{increase}} = \frac{(16,8\% - 9,6\%)}{9,6\%} \times 100\% = 75\%$$

## Pre-2017 Migration Patterns in Uzbekistan

Joo (2023) argues that prior to the 2017 structural and economic initiatives, Uzbekistan followed an economic model based on limited foreign dependency and self-dependence. Within this framework, the huge number of migrants seen as lazy people or economic losses, generally as a negative measure of national growth. The main approach of control was the exit visa system, that requires Uzbeks to get explicit approval from the Ministry of Interior to migrate to non-CIS countries (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2019). The procedure was intentionally made difficult by expensive fees and complex administrative processes. These obstacles were intended to keep specific individuals from leaving the country. This isolated method encouraged a culture of informality, which many citizens of Uzbekistan preferred to migrate via unregulated ways, as stated by Joo (2023). There were few international labor contracts or government protection procedures in existence because emigration was formally discouraged. As a result, many workers in overseas informal employment sectors experienced vulnerability, exploitation, and unclear legal status (Seitz, 2019).

## Post-2017 Structural Transformation

Alejandro Simone (2025) states that the policy changes, which started in 2017 and included significant changes to trade openness and a unified exchange rate, were part of the transition to a market-oriented economy. The primary turning point occurred in 2019 when a regular foreign passport replaced the place of the exit visa system (Erdogan, 2021). The Uzbek embassy in Ukraine (2017) claims that this regulatory liberalization allowed the government to rename the migrants as contributors to the country's economic prosperity rather than as lazy individuals or economic losses. According to International Organization for Migration, the migration was fully constructed into national development policy by 2025 as the government enable the legal framework to defend rights of its citizens in foreign countries. Seitz (2019) reports that the new reformist framework changed mandatory permits with voluntary registration system and makes subsidized loans available for travel tickets. This leads to reduction of financial barriers to legal migration.

## Development of migration infrastructure

The key aspect of new period is the establishment of more comprehensive migration system that involves legal regulations, digital tools and education programs (Erdogan, 2021). The implementation of the Law "On Private Employment Agencies" in 2018 eliminated the state monopoly on employment market whereas the online platforms were developed to centralize verified postings for jobs as stated by Prague Process (2022). These institutions make an effort to rise the honesty of recruitment process and minimize the power of unregulated intermediaries.

Moreover, the government of Uzbekistan developed training centers that provide aspiring migrants with vocational and language lessons to satisfy the standards of high-wage labor markets in Europe and East Asia (Uzdaily.uz, 2026). These kinds of centers offer migrants



international certificates, which permits the migrants to find employment in professional labor fields like healthcare and logistics.

### **Macroeconomic significance of Remittances**

The formalization of labor migration has converted remittances into a key component of macroeconomic stabilization, with inflows reaching 18,9 billion USD in 2025, compared to previous year there was 28 % rise (Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2026). These funds serve as a crucial source of foreign currency as the banks buying net surplus of 9,7 billion USD from Uzbek citizens, supporting the stabilization of domestic currency market.

Based on the press release of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2026), another key development is the rapid transition to online financial services between 2024 and 2026. The total inflows of person-to-person transfers to bank cards increased to 46 % by 2025 because of simplicity and reduced costs of mobile banking apps. This digitalization promotes financial security by bringing migrant households into the regulated banking system while offering protection against economic shocks.

### **Diversification of international migration destinations**

Jack Halsey, Nasim Ali Ahmad and Caroline Southworth (2025) state that the primary goal of policy is to increase migration destinations, reducing economic dependence on traditional local labor markets and making it more robust to external shocks. Since 2022, there had been a significant rise in the volume of people seeking new employment opportunities. For example, the number of seasonal work visas issued by United Kingdom to Uzbek citizens increased from 556 in 2021 to over 6,200 by 2024 (Baratov, 2026). High-paid employment opportunities in the United Kingdom and European Union benefit the household savings of Uzbek citizens as the domestic average wages lower.

According to federal ministry of interior of Germany (2024), Formal agreements, such as the 2024 Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership with Germany, have also strengthened strategic cooperation. This contract puts a strong emphasis on using legal mobility channels and vocational cooperation to bring in skilled workers in the construction and healthcare industries from Uzbekistan to Germany (Special Eurasia, 2025). These bilateral agreements provide an organized framework for hiring, guaranteeing that employees have access to health insurance and legal safeguards that are often not available in unregulated sectors.

### **Legal protection**

The legal protection of Uzbek migrants abroad is supported by the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, presidential decrees and bilateral labor agreements. Article 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan clearly states that 'The Republic of Uzbekistan shall guarantee defense and protection to all its citizens both on its territory and abroad. A citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan may not be expelled from Uzbekistan or turned over to another State. The State, in accordance with the norms of international law, shall take care of the maintaining and developing ties with compatriots residing abroad.' This article provides legal basis for migrant protection policies. In addition, according to the clause (g) of paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. DP-59 (2024), Uzbek migrants who suffered from violence or whose rights are violated can be provided with a lawyer. Moreover, legal protection is reinforced by the Law 'on



Private Employment Agencies' which regulates requirements for financial guarantee. Private employment agencies are required to place funds in the amount of 4,000 times the base calculation in a commercial bank until the expiry of license. This reduces risks connected to informal recruitment and private recruitment channels.

Furthermore, Uzbekistan has signed bilateral labor agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkiye, which ensures equal treatment with local employees, labor rights protections and fair salaries. For instance, according to the article 10, remuneration must not be lower for Uzbek migrants than the established wages for citizens of the host country. Employers are obliged to pay compensations in the event of death or injury as stated in the article 14.

Overall, legal protection systems provide an important basis for protecting migrant workers through bilateral agreements and financial guarantees.

## Recommendations

One of the major problems in the labor market of Uzbekistan is the skills mismatch between the skills the graduates have and employers need. The strong cooperation between the universities and companies is extremely necessary to solve this issue. Lectures and seminars have to be designed by universities with direct input by employers. Uzbekistan should establish 'Sectoral Skills Council' involving universities, businesses and state agencies to improve alignment between education and labor market demand. These councils help universities to understand better which skills and qualifications are in demand in sectors such as healthcare, engineering, manufacturing and entrepreneurship. Consequently, graduates will develop skills that are actually more relevant to the needs of employer. In addition, higher education institutions should focus on practical learning rather than theoretical knowledge. Universities should increase the role of training and internship programmes in the academic life of students. Students would gain experience before graduation which prepare them for future career. Programmes such as Academic Innovation Fund should be expanded to improve sustainable and long-term partnerships between private sectors and higher institutions.

State subsidies and financial support play an important role in addressing issues such as skills mismatch in the labor market of Uzbekistan. Financial support should be given to sectors such as nursing, information technologies, construction, logistics, agriculture, tourism where there is a high expectation of increase in skilled labor demand. These subsidies should be connected to education, training programmes, seminars in universities and vocational institutions to make sure that subsidies are used efficiently. For example, the subsidies can be used to buy food processing technologies, training programmes in agribusiness in agriculture sector.

To address the issue of female migration, there should be a huge support by the government for female entrepreneurship. Many women migrate because they do not have access to the capital or business knowledge. The government should work with banks and training institutions to provide women low-interest credit lines, startup grants, seminars about starting business.

Overall, developing strong cooperation between universities and private sectors, allocating targeted subsidies for specific sectors in demand would help to decrease skills mismatch, improve employment opportunities and contribute to Uzbekistan's long-term economic development.

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